@techreport{TD:100807,
	att_abstract={{The explosive growth of cellular traffic and
its highly dynamic nature often make it prohibitive or even
infeasible for a cellular service provider to provision enough
cellular resources to support the peak traffic demands. The
current best practice is to have the cellular service provider
deploy alternative wireless technologies, such as Wi-Fi and
Femtocells, on its own to complement the cellular network.
However, this is not a viable long-term solution due to its
high cost and the problem of wireless interference.
In this paper, we propose iDEAL, a novel auction-based
incentive framework that allows a cellular service provider
to leverage resources from third-party resource owners on
demand by buying capacity whenever needed through reverse
auctions. iDEAL has several distinctive features: (i)
iDEAL explicitly accounts for the diverse spatial coverage
of different resources and can effectively foster competition
among third-party resource owners in different regions, resulting
in significant savings for the cellular service provider.
(ii) iDEAL provides revenue incentives for third-party resource
owners to participate in the reverse auction and be
truthful in the bidding process. (iii) iDEAL is provably efficient.
(iv) iDEAL effectively guards against collusion. (v)
iDEAL effectively copes with the dynamic nature of traffic
demands. In addition, iDEAL has several useful extensions
that address various important practical issues.
Extensive evaluation based on real traces from a large US
cellular service provider clearly demonstrates the effectiveness
of our approach. We further demonstrate the feasibility
of iDEAL using a prototype implementation.}},
	att_authors={tc6492, rj2124, kr2812, lr7762},
	att_categories={},
	att_copyright={{IEEE}},
	att_copyright_notice={{This version of the work is reprinted here with permission of IEEE for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in 2012. {{, 2013-04-14}}
}},
	att_donotupload={},
	att_private={false},
	att_projects={},
	att_tags={Wireless Data,  Traffic Offload,  WiFi,  Auctions},
	att_techdoc={true},
	att_techdoc_key={TD:100807},
	att_url={http://web1.research.att.com:81/techdocs_downloads/TD:100807_DS1_2012-10-25T02:09:46.853Z.pdf},
	author={Tae won Cho and Rittwik Jana and Kadangode Ramakrishnan and Leonid Razoumov and Wei Dong and Swati Rallapalli and Lili Qiu and Yin Zhang},
	institution={{IEEE Infocom 2013 Conference}},
	month={April},
	title={{iDEAL: Incentivized Cellular Offloading via Auctions}},
	year=2013,
}